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1. INTRODUCTION 
Accountability is a fundamental element  of contemporary public policy and one of the 
principles of ‘ good governance’  recognised by the OECD, the World Bank and the European 
Commission (CEC, 2001; Harlow 2002; OECD, 2005; SIGMA, 1999). The concept  of 
accountability has known an uninterrupted rise in popularity over the past  decade – both in 
policy-making and academia (Bovens, 2005, 2007 and 2010; Dubnick, 2002; Mulgan, 2003) – 
and its signif icance has been further reinforced by the recent  economic downturn and the 
associated t ightening of public f inances. As a result ,  polit icians and policy-makers are 
increasingly sensit ive to the necessity to j ust ify their act ion on the use made of scarcer and 
scarcer public resources, a use that  needs to be (or that , at  least , needs to be perceived to 
be) relevant , j ust if ied, eff icient  and effect ive.  
However, the pursuit  of accountability is not  the primary aim of any public policy. The 
primary concern of polit icians and policy-makers is the achievement  of a policy’ s intended 
goals, parameterised on the resources mobilised. Whilst  some literature suggests that  
certain types of accountabilit y can improve policy performance (Currist ine, 2005; Gormley 
and Balla, 2004), there is wide consensus that  the pursuit  of accountabilit y and 
effect iveness can run counter each other and that  ‘ at  some point , accountabilit y must  
begin to yield diminishing return and become counter-product ive’  (Mulgan, 2003, 236). 
Enact ing accountabilit y entails costs and can lead to perverse effects in terms of policy 
achievements and effect iveness (Gregory, 2007; Mulgan, 2003; Barberis, 1998). 2
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 For instance, rendering public agents risk-averse (Gregory, 2007) and inducing goal displacement  
(Mulgan, 2003).  
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This paper’ s key concern is the accountabilit y/ effect iveness t rade-off .  This is a topic that  
has surfaced onto the policy and academic debate in the early 2000s, suggest ing that  
governments and administ rat ions ‘ have become too focussed on inputs and processes of 
administering public policies and have lost  sight  of the outcomes that  they intend to 
achieve’  (Talbot , 2005, p. 500). The paper addresses this theme in the context  of European 
Cohesion policy, i.e. the extent  to which the accountabilit y mechanisms in place in this 
context  are indeed inst rumental or det rimental for the policy’ s abilit y to achieve its 
intended goals.  
This focus is j ust if ied by at  least  two main reasons: because Cohesion policy has been 
extensively crit icised for its lack of effect iveness (or lack of def init ive evidence of this) as 
well as for its overwhelming emphasis on inputs and procedures, and because this policy 
presents part icular features that  have rendered formalising accountabilit y mechanisms 
paramount , in order to avoid ambiguit ies regarding which actor has responsibilit y over 
which aspects of the policy. They are: (i) the fact  that  Cohesion policy rests on the 
principle of ‘ shared management ’  (art .  274 TFEU and art .  14 of the General Regulat ion) 
according to which the European Commission and Member State authorit ies j oint ly share 
the overall responsibilit y for it ;  (ii) the fact  that  policy implementat ion is characterised by 
a mult i-level allocat ion of tasks, with a large proport ion of the resources managed direct ly 
by meso-level authorit ies within the Member States, in line with the so-called subsidiarity 
principle; and, last ly, the fact  that  partners and stakeholders are involved (or at  least  
should be) in the processes of policy implementat ion, as dictated by the so-called 
partnership principle (enforced by art icle 11 of the General Regulat ion, Council Regulat ion 
no. 1083/ 2006, 11 July 2006). 3   
These features have made it  necessary to codify accountability relat ions in the f ield of 
Cohesion policy. As a result ,  accountabilit y is explicit ly foreseen in the Treaty on the 
Funct ioning of the European Union and in the Regulat ions that  govern the policy (St ructural 
Funds General Regulat ion, Fund-specif ic regulat ions and the EU f inancial regulat ion). 4 
These address accountabilit y from both an inst itut ional and an operat ional perspect ive.  
From an inst itut ional perspect ive, they provide a clear definit ion of roles between all of the 
authorit ies involved in the policy: between European Commission, Member States, European 
Court  of Auditors and European Parliament , with regard to agenda set t ing, policy 
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formulat ion, oversight  and overall policy responsibilit y, and, at  a more operat ional level, 
between Managing Authority, Cert ifying Authority, Audit  Authority, nat ional coordinat ing 
authorit ies and European Commission, with regard to policy delivery.  
From an operat ional perspect ive, this legislat ive framework establishes the rules and 
procedures that  must  be complied with in policy implementat ion, in part icular with regard 
to the involvement  of partners in programme design and implementat ion (art .  11 of the 
General Regulat ion), monitoring and report ing (art icles 63-68 and 29-31), evaluat ion 
(art icles 47-49); f inancial management  (art icles 15, 52-62, 70-102) and the communicat ion 
to potent ial beneficiaries and to the public (art .  69).  As a result  of this comprehensive 
legislat ive framework within Cohesion policy there is a st rong emphasis on accountabilit y, 
especially f inancial and procedural types of  accountabilit y. This emphasis has however 
generated the sort  of perverse effects denounced by Mulgan (2003) and Gregory (2007) with 
regard to effect iveness; for instance, an overemphasis on spending per se as opposed to 
spending on those proj ects that  are best  suited to deliver the programmes’  goals (Bacht ler 
et  al ,  2009; Davies and Polverari,  2011). 
This paper aims to assess the accountabilit y/ eff iciency t rade-off within Cohesion policy and 
the causes for this focusing on the second of the above two aspects, i.e. the rules and 
procedures that  inform the policy’ s operat ional processes. It  addresses the following key 
quest ions: 
x What  is the nature of accountability in the framework of Cohesion policy? 
Specif ically, what  types of accountabilit y are pursued in the management  and 
implementat ion of Cohesion policy?  
x Are dif ferent  types of accountabilit y – notably f inancial,  procedural, outcome and 
performance accountability - pursued to the same degree?  
x Does the pursuit  of accountabilit y and, more specif ically, of dif ferent  types 
thereof, run counter the effect ive pursuit  of the policy’ s overarching aims and of 
programmes’  goals?  
x What  lessons can be drawn for the reform of the policy for the period 2014-2020? 
The cent ral thesis of this paper is that  dif ferent  types of accountabilit y are not  pursued to 
the same degree, due to the dif ferent  level of ‘ cogency’  associated with dif ferent  
processes. This in turn is due to the sanct ions associated with these and their related 
‘ hardness’ . The paper argues that  the existence of such dif ferent  degrees of cogency for 
the dif ferent  policy processes determines a distort ion in the balance achieved in terms of 
the pursuit  of f inancial and procedural accountabilit y over outcome and performance 
accountability, and in terms of the pursuit  of accountabilit y over effect iveness.  
This thesis is put  to the test  in the following sect ions. Sect ion 2, discusses the concept  of 
accountability and its operat ionalisat ion in the context  of Cohesion policy; Sect ion 3 
assesses the degree of cogency associated with each of the processes reviewed, discussing 
the sanct ions in place for each and the implicat ions that  the st ronger or weaker cogency 
have for the accountabilit y/ effect iveness t rade-off ; last ly, Sect ion 4 presents some 
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conclusions which link the evidence produced on the distort ive effect  of incoherent  levels 
of compliance with the debate on the reform of the policy and the proposals contained in 
the Fif th Cohesion Report . 
 
2. DEFINING ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF 
EUROPEAN COHESION POLICY  
The topic of accountabilit y has been the subj ect  of abundant  literature. One element  of 
consensus in this wide literature – and perhaps the only one - is that  accountabilit y is a 
word of mult iple meanings (Day and Klein, 1984; Oliver, 1991; Bovens, 2005 and 2007; 
Dowdle, 2006; Dubnick, 2002; Mulgan, 2000 and 2003; Koppell,  2005). Beyond the generic 
def init ion of “ liabilit y to give account  of, and answer for, discharge of dut ies or conduct ”  
(Oxford English Dict ionary), accountabilit y has amongst  others been defined as  
“ being liable to be required to give an account  or an explanat ion of act ions and, 
where appropriate, to suffer the consequences, take the blame or undertake to put  
mat ters right  if  it  should appear that  errors have been made”  (Oliver, 1991, p. 22); 
as 
“ a relat ionship between two sets of persons or (more often) organizat ions in which 
the former agree to keep the lat ter informed, to offer them explanat ions for 
decisions made, and to submit  to any predetermined sanct ions that  they may impose. 
The lat ter, meanwhile, are subj ect  to the command of the former, must  provide 
required informat ion, explain obedience or disobedience to the commands thereof, 
and accept  the consequences for things done or left  undone.”  (Schmit ter, 2004, p. 
47); 
and, more succinct ly, as 
“ a relat ionship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligat ion to 
explain and to j ust ify his or her conduct , the forum can pose quest ions and pass 
j udgement , and the actor may face consequences”  (Bovens, 2007, p. 450). 
As the above definit ions highlight , accountabilit y relates essent ially to the relat ionship 
between two actors or groups thereof: those who are accountable for their conduct , i.e. 
the decision-makers (Held, 2004), accountors (Mulgan, 2003), or accountabilit y-holdees 
(Papadopoulos, 2007), on the one hand, and those to whom accountabilit y is bestowed, i.e. 
the decision-takers (Held, 2004), ‘ accountees’  (Mulgan, 2003), and ‘ accountabilit y holders’  
(Papadopoulos, 2007), on the other. Thus, accountabilit y stems from two key principles 
(Mulgan, 2003, pp. 12-13): the delegat ion, principal-agent  principle and the affected rights 
principle. The f irst  principle declares that  when one actor (agent) acts on behalf  of another 
(principal),  the former has the obligat ion to ensure that  their act ions or inact ions are in 
line with the preferences expressed by the lat ter. Conversely, the principal has the right  
and faculty to call and hold the agent  to account  for her behaviour. The second principle, 
on the other hand, places an obligat ion on any public agent  (and indeed, more broadly, any 
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cit izen) to be responsible for her act ions or inact ions that  have an impact  on a second 
party, even outwith a delegat ion, principal-agent  relat ionship. 
As such, public accountabilit y is part icularly complex and often concealed, because of the 
dispersed nature of actors and forums at  both ends - the accountabilit y holders, on the one 
hand, and the accountabilit y holdees, on the other - and because of the lack of a clear-cut  
principal-agent  relat ionship between the two groups in many cases.   
In the framework of Cohesion policy, such complexity is exacerbated by the shared 
management  principle, and by the mult i-level nature and partnership-orientat ion of the 
policy. A considerable body of literature exists on the challenges posed to accountabilit y by 
mult i-level and networked governance arrangements (Piat toni, 2010; Bache and Chapman, 
2008; Benz et  al  2007; Harlow and Rawling, 2007; Papadopoulos, 2007; Bache and Flinders, 
2004; Rhodes 2003) and much of this can be applied to the assessment  of accountabilit y in 
the context  of Cohesion policy. It  points to the following main problems: 
x f irst ,  the problem of ‘many hands’ , i.e. the dif f iculty to at t ribute decisions to any 
specif ic actor (Bovens, 2007; Piat toni, 2010);  
x second, the reduced role of hierarchical relat ions in the organisat ional 
arrangements that  govern policy-making in mult i-level set t ings, entailing that  “ the 
assumpt ion of inst itut ional hierarchy which underpins so many discussions of 
bureaucrat ic accountability no longer holds”  (Rhodes, 2003, pp. 58-59); and,  
x last ly, the ‘ uncoupling from the democrat ic circuit ’  of decision making-procedures 
(Papadopoulos, 2007, 470), which in Cohesion policy is exacerbated by the high 
technicalit y of the procedures through which the policy is implemented (which 
entails that  a considerable degree of decision-making rests on unelected 
technocrats at  the mult iple levels that  the policy intersects).  
All of these elements can make it  challenging to establish: (i) who has the responsibilit y 
over policy-decisions and act ions; (ii) who should be quest ioned on the appropriateness of  
such decisions and act ions, and approached to seek redress; and, (iii) who should be 
sanct ioned for incorrect  conduct . Although the TFEU and Structural Funds regulat ions 
address these issues in great  detail, as discussed in int roduct ion, the paper quest ions 
whether these rules, and the ensuing pract ices, present  grey areas which entail that  the 
accountability pursued in Cohesion policy management  and implementat ion is part icularly 
geared towards certain types of accountabilit y, ult imately hindering policy effect iveness. 5  
To assess whether this is the case, the analysis focuses on a wider def init ion of 
accountability than those provided above – which includes also the ex ant e phase of 
accountability, i.e. the decision-making stages and the part icipat ion of accountability 
holders in these – and on a dist inct ion of accountabilit y types based on the ‘ obj ect ’  of 
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accountability, i.e. between f inancial,  procedural, outcome and performance 
accountability. The definit ion adopted of accountabilit y is the following: 
a part icular type of relat ionship between two actors or groups, decision-makers and 
decision-takers, where the f irst  acts on the second’ s behalf , or where the f irst ,  
because of its act ions or inact ions, determines an impact  upon the second. For the 
relat ionship between these two groups to be one of accountability: (i) decision-takers 
must  be able to inform the decision-makers’  choices; (ii) decision-makers must  be 
prepared to give account  of their choices (act ions and inact ions) and of the outcomes 
of such choices (with respect  to a pluralit y of aspects of their act ivity, ranging from 
the use made of inputs to the performance achieved); and (iii) decision-takers must  
have the faculty to express dissat isfact ion and request  changes to the course of 
act ion adopted. Enforcement  and sanct ioning mechanisms must  be in place to ensure 
that  the correct  course of act ion is restored where necessary and to act  as a 
deterrent  for accountabilit y failings in future. (Polverari 2011, based on Mezlev, 
2003; Mulgan, 2003; and, Held, 2004). 
This definit ion acknowledges explicit ly that  for decision-takers to be able bring decision-
makers to account , there needs to be recognit ion that  the recipients of this account -giving 
act ivity (the policy-takers) ought  to have the opportunity to part icipate in defining what  is 
meant  by appropriate act ion and that  this opportunity must  be inst itut ionalised. This is 
because implicit  assumpt ions of what  the right  course of act ion might  be may lend 
themselves to fallacy (Polverari,  2011). Within Cohesion policy this is enshrined in the 
partnership principle. The proposed definit ion also acknowledges the necessity of 
enforcement  tools and sanct ioning mechanisms to ensure that  accountabilit y is fulf il led, 
not  j ust  so as to rect ify undue act ion, but  also to act  as a deterrent  to wrong-doing 
(Papadopoulos, 2007, p. 471).  
As ant icipated, the analysis focuses on four part icular types of accountabilit y:  
(i) Financial  account abil i t y “ concerns t racking and report ing on allocat ion, disbursement  
and ut il izat ion of f inancial resources, using the tools of audit ing, budget ing and 
account ing”  (Brinkerhoff,  2004; also Bovens, 2007); 
(ii) Procedural  accountabil i t y relates to the correct  compliance of the acts and procedures 
put  in place for policy delivery with the relevant  administ rat ive law, standards and codes of 
pract ice (such as the observance of public procurement  and tendering rules for proj ect  
select ion and of report ing and monitoring obligat ions) (Bovens, 2007); 
(iii) Out come accountabil i t y relates to the outcomes achieved, notably the outputs, results 
and, where these can be established, the impacts of the intervent ions (MEANS, 1999);  
(iv) Performance account abil i t y pertains to the performance of the policy, assessed on the 
outcomes achieved or their achievabilit y (when assessed ex ant e or in i t inere) cont rasted 
to the goals set .  In other words, that  which relates “ to demonstrat ing and account ing for 
performance in light  of agreed-upon performance targets”  (Brinkerhoff,  2004, pp. 374). 
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3. DIFFERENT TYPES OF ACCOUNTABILITY PURSUED IN THE 
MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF COHESION 
POLICY: DIFFERENT POLICY PROCESSES, DIVERGING 
DEGREES OF COGENCY AND COMPLIANCE 
Defined as above, accountabilit y is fulf il led across all stages of the policy cycle. This paper 
focuses on the most  relevant  ones in terms of their potent ial impact  on effect iveness, 
notably the stages of: (i) st rategy formulat ion and programme design (in part icular through 
the part icipat ion of partners and stakeholders in this); (ii) monitoring and report ing; (iii) 
evaluat ion; and, (iv) f inancial management . 
 
3.1 Involvement of partners and stakeholders in policy-making 
The involvement  of partners and stakeholders in policy-making processes is required by art . 
11 of the General Regulat ion. This art icle foresees the involvement  of socio-economic 
partners, representat ives of civil society, environmental partners, non-governmental 
organisat ions, bodies responsible for promot ing equality between men and women in all 
stages of programme design and delivery: from the preparat ion, to the implementat ion 
(instead of ‘ f inancing’  as previously), monitoring and evaluat ion of Operat ional 
Programmes. 
The involvement  of partners and stakeholders in policy-making could have a marked effect  
on both accountabilit y – in all the facets above discussed, both ex ant e and ex post  – and 
effect iveness. First ,  it  can improve the responsiveness of programmes (the ex ant e t ype of 
accountability), by bet ter aligning st rategies with policy needs. Second, it  can increase the 
effect iveness of programmes by allowing Managing Authorit ies to access knowledge which is 
used to improve the target ing of intervent ions, consequent ly improving funding up-take and 
proj ect  quality. And third, it  can cont ribute to improved ex post  accountabilit y, insofar as 
the partners, as organised representat ions of interests, act  as a t ransmit ter and mult ipliers 
of programme informat ion to their const ituencies (thus increasing t ransparency and 
informat ion) and hold programme authorit ies to account  for the act ion taken, the way 
resources are spent , and the results achieved (Polverari and Michie, 2009 and 2010).  
This said, there is a considerable gap between theory and pract ice. The degree of cogency 
of the partnership-related regulatory requirements is weak: beyond the preamble to the 
regulat ion and the specif ic art icle on the partnership principle, there is very lit t le ment ion 
of partners or partnership throughout  the operat ional sect ions of the regulatory texts. No 
precise and formally binding inst ruct ions or guidance have been provided to programme 
managing authorit ies on how the principle should be applied in pract ice at  dif ferent  stages 
or funct ional tasks of the policy process, aside from the loose references to the need for 
partners to be consulted on the NSRF and for OPs to be drawn up in coordinat ion with 
partners. This leaves the actual interpretat ion of how to comply with Art icle 11 to domest ic 
authorit ies and thus the implementat ion of the partnership principle reliant  on domest ic 
t radit ions and pract ices (Polverari and Michie, 2009 and 2010). 
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In addit ion, no real sanct ioning mechanisms – or even inducements – are foreseen to 
st imulate compliance. Thus, unsurprisingly, compliance with art . 11 varies markedly across 
Europe, depending on domest ic cultures and pract ices, and, on the whole remains often 
weak (Polverari and Michie, 2009 and 2010). 6 As in the past  periods, partners are generally 
more involved in programme design than in the other processes of programme 
management , and even in programme design there are asymmetries in the actual ‘ weight ’  
of dif ferent  partners and cont rast ing evidence on partners’  inf luence in set t ing programme 
st rategies.  
To further reinforce the assessment  that  the involvement  of partners and stakeholders in 
programme management  is not  part icularly effect ive as a tool of accountabilit y is the 
f inding of a recent  study that  despite some evidence of inclusion of socio-economic and non 
governmental partners in evaluat ion processes for example (e.g. through consultat ions for 
the draft ing of the Evaluat ion Plans, evaluat ion Steering Groups, disseminat ion act ivit ies), 
these actors do not  generally appear to hold Managing Authorit ies to account  on the use 
that  has been made of resources and the outcomes achieved. Partner input  is concent rated 
in the init ial stages of programme design and somet imes in proj ect  generat ion/ select ion. 
Very lit t le interest  (or at  least  act ivity) was detected on partners being involved in 
assessing programme achievements, and why certain expected impacts have not  been 
achieved. This is part  of a wider concern with the degree to which programme authorit ies 
and partnership fora (such as the Programme Monitoring Commit tee) are giving suff icient  
at tent ion to the performance of their programmes and the policy as a whole (Polverari and 
Michie, 2009 and 2010). 
 
3.2 Monitoring and reporting 
The regulat ions place considerable monitoring and report ing obligat ions on Managing 
Authorit ies, Member State authorit ies and the European Commission (art .  63-68 and 29-31 
of Gen. Reg.). They include the obligat ions: 
x for Managing Authorit ies, to establish and implement  monitoring systems able to 
t rack f inancial and physical data (in many cases also procedural informat ion) and 
to submit  annually Implementat ion Reports to the European Commission; 
x for Member State authorit ies, to prepare twice over the course of the programme 
period a “ St rategic Report ”  out lining the progress being achieved towards the 
goals of the policy as established by the Treaty (art .  174 TFEU), the priorit ies 
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out lined in the Community St rategic Guidelines, the goals of the Lisbon agenda and 
the administ rat ion of the funds (based on a st ructure provided by DG Regio). 7 
In principle, these obligat ions are intended to fulf il all t ypes of accountability and they do 
so to a signif icant  degree. There are, however, some shortcomings in the effect ive 
realisat ion of these tasks. Notwithstanding considerable improvements made over 
programme periods (Bacht ler et  al ,  2009), monitoring systems are st il l most ly focussed on 
f inancial rather than physical indicators and geared towards the reaching of N+2 targets. 
Limitat ions and diff icult ies are being faced by programme Managing Authorit ies with the 
t racking of physical indicators, especially where programmes are large and composite, and 
involve delegat ion of delivery responsibilit ies to Implement ing Bodies, with the consequent  
scope for diverging interpretat ions and errors. The intended rat ionalisat ion of indicators’  
systems announced at  the beginning of the programme period has been achieved only in 
part  and various programme authorit ies are current ly engaged with a revision and 
simplif icat ion of their systems. Halfway into the programme period, there are st il l OPs 
whose monitoring systems are st il l not  fully operat ional (Vironen, 2010, pp. 17-18). From a 
EU-wide perspect ive, there is st il l wide variat ion across programmes with regard to the 
indicators used to t rack physical outcomes (Mendez et  al ,  2010), which for this period are 
only provided at  the level of priorit ies rather than measures. 
Useful informat ion on f inancial,  procedural and even (limited) physical progress can 
generally be found in the Annual Implementat ion Reports (AIRs) which present  meaningful 
overviews of programme process. The AIRs are now also required to provide “ the indicat ive 
breakdown of the allocat ion of funds by categories...”  (art  67 General Regulat ion), however 
evidence suggests that  not  all programmes provide this type of informat ion and even when 
they t ry to do so, they are faced with methodological dif f icult ies entailed by the ambiguous 
descript ion of the codes, which means that  the expenditure under the same proj ect  or 
measure could be allocated to dif ferent  codes (Mendez et  al ,  2010). 
Last ly, there is widespread consensus in the policy community that  the 2009 st rategic 
report ing exercise has been disappoint ing, with it s limited actual ‘ st rategic’  content  and 
the rigidity entailed by the checklist  produced by the European Commission. Important ly, 
whilst  these reports were supposed to include informat ion on output  and results indicators, 
many did not  provide any quant itat ive informat ion or qualitat ive assessment  of these and, 
whilst  the Commission requested data on the core indicators to the nat ional authorit ies, 
only half  of these complied with this request  (Mendez et  al ,  2010, p. 23). 
For all the above processes, the enforcement  can be considered medium, in the sense that  
compliance is on the whole ensured but  in a patchy manner and in some cases in more 
formal than substant ive terms.  
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 In addit ion, for the European Commission to submit  annual progress reports, syntheses of the 
Member States’  St rategic Reports, and periodic “ Cohesion Reports”  to the Council (art .  175 TFEU).  
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3.3 Evaluation  
The regulat ions foresee a number of obligat ions placed upon dif ferent  authorit ies with 
regard to evaluat ion. Evaluat ion comprises ex ante evaluat ion, aimed at  set t ing programme 
goals and realist ic targets (art .  48(2) of the General Regulat ion); ongoing evaluat ion, 
generally intended as a set  of more or less integrated themat ic evaluat ions (somet imes 
complementary to interim stock-taking evaluat ive exercises) during the programme period 
(Polverari et  al ,  2007) (art .  48(3)); and, ex post  evaluat ion, carried out  at  the end of each 
programme period (art .  49(3)). All three types of evaluat ion should in principle fulf il 
various types of accountabilit y. In pract ice, however, they all present  shortcomings as 
inst ruments for accountabilit y. 
Ex ant e evaluat ion is carried out  “ under the responsibilit y of the authority responsible for 
the preparat ion of the programming documents”  (art .  48(2)(4)). 8 It  could be a tool for 
f inancial, outcome and performance accountabilit y, given that  its purpose is to establish 
the parameters for polit icians and policy-makers on what  policy act ion should set  out  to 
achieve. However, a recurring crit icism to ex ant e evaluat ion, echoed also in the Fif th 
Cohesion Report , is that  more often than not  ex ant e evaluat ion is carried out  in parallel 
rather than before programme preparat ion, and that , rather than providing evidence for 
st rategy set t ing and programme design, it  often simply ‘ j ust if ies’  choices that  have already 
been pre-made by polit icians and programme-managers (see also Bacht ler et  al ,  2009). In 
RCE areas, the subsuming of Cohesion policy programme within broader domest ic st rategies 
in the current  period has further limited the substant ial nature of ex ant e evaluat ions.  
In pract ice, therefore, ex ant e evaluat ion serves as an inst rument  for both accountabilit y 
and effect iveness only to a limited degree (e.g. providing t ransparency/ informat ion).  
Although the compilat ion of  ex ante evaluat ions is required by the regulat ions, and 
notwithstanding a theoret ical scrut inising role fulf il led by DG Regio’ s Evaluat ion Unit ,  in 
realit y the scope for the European Commission to check the merit  of such exercises and 
seek rect if icat ion on both the evaluat ions and the programmes is limited, and the 
t imetable for programme preparat ion is generally such that  the evaluat ions (and the 
Commission’ s checks) are not  able to substant ially inf luence the content  of programmes. 9 
In other words, enforcement  for this type of potent ial accountabilit y tool is ‘ soft ’  and, as a 
result ,  compliance varies depending on domest ic context  and the possible existence, in the 
Member States, of supplementary enforcement  tools (e.g. where domest ic evaluat ion units 
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 For programmes under the Convergence obj ect ive, the regulat ions recommend that  ex ante 
evaluat ions be carried out  for each OP. For the other two obj ect ives, Member States can decide 
whether to undertake evaluat ions for individual programmes, groups of programmes, themes or 
Funds). 
9
 This quote, from the f inal report  of the recent  ex post  evaluat ion of 2000-2006 ERDF programmes is 
il lust rat ive of this: “ There was also a lack, in many cases, of a clear indicat ion in concrete terms of 
the obj ect ives of the policy implemented in a form which would enable the success or failure of the 
measures taken to be properly assessed. Often the aims of the policy were expressed in terms so 
general (e.g. an improvement  in regional compet it iveness) to make it  dif f icult ,  if  not  impossible, to 
j udge after the event  whether they were achieved or not . Though quant itat ive targets were often set  
and an indicator system established, as required by the St ructural Fund regulat ions, in many cases 
neither were linked in a meaningful way to ult imate policy obj ect ives.”  (Ward and Wolleb, 2010, p. 
10). 
10 
‘ push’  the domest ic authorit ies to pursue a more substant ial compliance). On the whole, 
the available evidence suggests that  the extent  to which ex ant e evaluat ion fulf ils an 
accountability funct ion is weak (except  as an addit ional t ransparency tool).  
Ongoing evaluat ion is foreseen by art . 48(3). This art icle is masterfully vague, however. 
This vagueness was part  offset  by the guidelines published in April 2007 by the European 
Commission which were also not  prescript ive, considerably wide-ranging and open to 
interpretat ion, allowing for signif icant  room for manoeuvre for the Managing Authorit ies in 
the Member States. In principle, such type of evaluat ion can fulf il anyone of the above 
listed accountabilit y types.  The extent  to which it  does so depends on the interpretat ion 
that  is given domest ically of this type of evaluat ion given that  in principle, according to the 
guidance formulated by the Commission, programme Managing Authorit ies could cover 
virtually any aspect  of the programmes. 10 Evidence gathered through the IQ-Net  research 
programme shows that  ongoing evaluat ion is being interpreted either as a succession of  
themat ic studies (planned, ad hoc and a mixture between the two), or as an integrat ion 
between themat ic studies and comprehensive mid-term evaluat ions similar in scope to 
those carried out  in the past  programme period (Polverari et  al ,  2007, p. 35). Whilst  the 
degree of enforcement  is soft  (given that  there are no real cont rols or sanct ions associated 
with the delivery of poor evaluat ions where these are accepted by the programmes 
Managing Authorit ies), the earmarking of programme resources for this purpose (under the 
technical assistance budget ) has meant  that  programme authorit ies do carry out  their 
ongoing evaluat ions. However, lit t le research has been carried out  on their comparat ive 
overall quality; they appear to generally focus predominant ly on f inancial expenditure and 
procedural issues (so as to support  absorpt ion maximisat ion and prevent  N+2); and, have 
been crit icised for lack of independence and real ‘ crit ique’  (Polverari and Vitale, 2010). 
The extent  to which ongoing evaluat ions fulf il an accountabilit y funct ion is therefore on the 
whole probably rather limited.   
Last ly, ex post  evaluat ion is carried out  by the Commission in cooperat ion with the Member 
States (art .  49(3)(1)). It  is intended to assess the extent  to which programme resources 
were used (f inancial accountabilit y), the effect iveness and eff iciency of the programmes 
and their socio-economic impacts (outcome and performance accountabilit y) (art .  
49(3)(2)). In reality, the extent  to which ex post  evaluat ions have been able to assess these 
elements in the last  two programme period can be quest ioned. For the 1994-99 period, the 
approach taken was a comprehensive one, whereby all programmes were covered and 
evaluators were asked to capture the programme effects on the whole range of policy areas 
and priorit ies entailed by the programmes. However, this degree of generality led to an 
equally general set  of f indings, which lent  the evaluat ion to crit icism. As a result  the 
approach taken for the evaluat ion of the past  programmes has been one of increased 
select ivity, based on selected core themes explored largely through case studies. The 
extent  to which these exercises have fulf il led an accountabilit y funct ion has been limited, 
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 Working Paper 5 suggests that  evaluat ions focus on the relevance, consistency, effect iveness 
and/ or eff iciency of the programmes which would mean f inancial,  procedural,  outcome and 
performance accountabilit y. The exact  focus, however, is left  to the discret ion of the Managing 
Authorit ies. 
11 
however. First ,  whilst  this EU-wide approach is useful to gauge a macro-picture of 
achievements, there has been only very limited assessment  of impacts. Let  us consider, for 
example, that  although art .  43 of the General Regulat ion for the 2000-2006 period (Reg. 
No. 1260/ 1999) states that  the ex post  evaluat ions need to be completed by no later than 
three years after the end of the programming period, the work relat ing to the ex post  
evaluat ion of the 2000-06 mainst ream ERDF OPs, on the cont rary, was concluded in April 
2010, with evaluat ion work being carried out  between 2007 and 2009, even prior to the 
off icial closure of the programmes. 11 And indeed, the synthesis report  of the whole 
evaluat ion exercise is very caut ious about  the potent ial of the work to assess impacts:  
“ The context  in which cohesion policy was implemented, the often small scale of the 
funding in relat ion to the forces it  was intended to counteract  and the many other 
factors at  work mean that  it  is unrealist ic in most  cases to expect  to be able to t race 
a direct  link between policy and regional developments. This is all the more so in 
view of the often lengthy t ime lags involved between measures being implemented 
and having a discernible effect  on developments.”  (Ward and Wolleb, 2010, p. 10, 
emphasis added). 
Thus, it  could be deducted that  the current  round of ex post  evaluat ion was carried out  
more for polit ical purposes, and to support  the preparat ion of the Fif th Cohesion Report , 
rather than to assess the use made of funding, the impacts achieved and the effect iveness 
of support . Second, the fact  that  the Commission-driven ex post  evaluat ion are being by 
and large not  supplemented by programme-specif ic ex post  evaluat ions does not  allow 
drawing an assessment  of the results, impacts, eff iciency and effect iveness achieved within 
specif ic programmes. Since the Regulat ions do not  foresee this type of obligat ion for 
programme Managing Authorit ies this is hardly ever done. In summary, there is limited 
evidence to suggest  that  evaluat ion is an effect ive tool for accountabilit y, especially with 
regard to outcome and performance accountabilit y. 
 
3.4 Financial management 
A crucial aspect  of the programme management  process is represented by the eff icient  
f inancial management  of programmes. This embraces the whole f inancial cycle of the 
programmes, from the processing of payment  claims of f inal beneficiaries, to the payment  
declarat ions to the European Commission and the lat ter’ s annual accounts to the European 
Parliament . Not  least  in response to scandals with the use of European resources, both in 
general and within Cohesion policy specif ically (Davies and Polverari,  2011), f inancial 
management  is the most  regulated of all programme management  processes, with a large 
number of art icles of the General Regulat ions devoted to dif ferent  aspects of this. It  is also 
the process which presents the st rongest  cogency, given the existence of clear-cut  and 
grave sanct ions (the loss of resources), for programme managers and polit icians at  both 
meso and nat ional levels: 
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 ht tp:/ / ec.europa.eu/ regional_policy/ sources/ docgener/ evaluat ion/ rado2_en.htm.  
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x Payment  declarat ions – by both beneficiaries and Cert ifying Authorit ies - have to 
be compiled according to the specif ied standards, as claims with missing 
informat ion will not  be paid out . In addit ion, the risk of incurring in the frequent , 
and often overlapping audits – by nat ional audit  authorit ies, European Court  of 
Auditors and the European Commission internal audit  off ices – acts as a st rong 
deterrent  to a superf icial approach to claims handling, given that , due to the 
sampling method ut il ised, even the most  t rivial mistake could have considerable 
consequences in terms of loss of resources. 12  
x A further incent ive to maintain f inancial management  procedures in good order is 
represented by the necessity, in the current  programme period at  least , to have a 
descript ion of each programme’ s management  and cont rol system, approved by a 
nat ional independent  authority and by the European Commission: failing this, a 
programme’s f inancial circuit  is interrupted and no payment  from the European 
budget  will be received after the init ial advance (art .  71 and 72 of the General 
Regulat ion). 
x Last ly, programmes are subj ected to the so-called N+2/ 3 rule (art icles 93-97 of the 
General Regulat ion), which has the clear-cut  consequence that  resources unspent  
within a certain t ime-frame are lost . This rule has acted as a st rong incent ive in 
focusing the at tent ion of programme authorit ies on this task above any other. 
There is evidence of the distort ion that  this represents in terms of programme 
outcomes (Bacht ler et  al ,  2009), given that  the incent ive to spend is such that  
proj ects of lower quality or not  necessarily too f it t ing with the programmes’  
obj ect ives – even ‘ coherent  proj ects’ ,  i.e. proj ects already implemented with 
domest ic resources - are pushed through the proj ect  pipeline in order to keep 
expenditure f lowing and achieve the necessary targets. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The above narrat ive shows that  the rules and procedures that  govern Cohesion policy 
implementat ion determine in pract ice different  levels of compliance for the different  
processes. Such dif ferent iated compliance is due to the variable degree of ‘ cogency’  of the 
rules, which is caused by the combined effect  of the dif fering nature of the sanct ioning 
mechanisms foreseen for the various processes13 - as above discussed - and the limited 
human and f inancial resources available to programme managers, which entails that  
dif ferent  processes are essent ially in compet it ion with each other.  
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 Evidence from research carried out  in Italy indicates that  is risk is amplif ied in the f irst  years of 
implementat ion, where given the limited pool of proj ects being implemented, audits by dif ferent  
authorit ies tend to concent rate on the same group of proj ects (see on this Polverari and Vitale, 2010). 
13
 Some of the above processes have no sanct ioning tools at  all,  whilst  others respond to sanct ioning 
mechanisms of dif ferent  intensity (from harder - as. Programme managers are forced to privilege 
those processes that  are accompanied by hard sanct ions. 
13 
On the one hand, although there isn’ t  much evidence on the administ rat ive costs of 
St ructural Funds delivery and the studies on this topic present  discordant  f indings on the 
extent  of such costs in different  administ rat ive systems, 14 there is enough proof to suggest  
that  programme Managing Authorit ies are often understaffed and st ruggling to meet  
demands, as is test if ied by the virtually unanimous (and long-standing) calls for 
simplif icat ion and proport ionalit y.  
On the other hand, only some and not  all of  the programme management  processes entail 
sanct ions, and the degree of ‘ hardness’  of such sanct ions, where they are in place, is 
variable. For instance, whilst  failing to comply with rules in the f ield of f inancial 
management  entails tangible and serious consequences (interrupt ion of f inancial f lows and 
loss of resources), failing to comply with other aspects of programme implementat ion, 
especially in the f ields of partnership but  also of monitoring and evaluat ion, does not  entail 
part icular consequences, or formal rather than substant ial compliance is suff icient  to avoid 
potent ial penalt ies.  
Faced with mult iple demands and limited resources, programme managers are forced to 
assign priority to those tasks that  entail tangible sanct ions and st ronger cogency. These are 
also the processes that  relate to f inancial and procedural accountabilit y.  As a result ,  
f inancial and procedural accountabilit y take predominance over outcome and performance 
accountability, and this, in turn, has det rimental effects on effect iveness: the key concern 
is spending money, rather than delivering certain results and impacts (because it  is on this 
aspect  that  authorit ies and individuals are brought  to account ). Table 1 to follow provides 
an overview of the argument  above discussed, providing an assessment  of the compliance 
and enforcement  assigned to the phases of policy management  assessed in this paper – 
involvement  of partners and stakeholders in the policy cycle; monitoring and report ing; 
evaluat ion; and, f inancial management  – and the types of accountabilit y fulf il led in 
pract ice by such programming processes. 
Important  implicat ions can be derived from the argument  proposed in this paper for the 
debate on the reform of the policy for the period 2014-2020. This debate has touched upon 
some aspects of the above discussed issues. The Conclusions of the Fif th Cohesion Report   
st ress the need to shif t  from a logic dominated by inputs and procedures, to a logic of 
based on outcomes and performance (European Commission, 2010). According to the 
report , this should be achieved through a more clear-cut  ex ante indicat ion of goals and 
targets, linked to eff icient  monitoring systems, and the int roduct ion of new forms of 
condit ionality, intended to st rengthen the focus on outcomes. Yet , whether these proposals 
– which are in many cases generic (as is natural given the nature of the document ) – will be 
able to achieve this intended goal is at  best  dubious.  
The proposals relat ing to the st rengthening of evaluat ion, for example, especially ex ante 
evaluat ion, are not  accompanied by new mechanisms that  would ensure their enforcement . 
After all,  aren’ t  the Operat ional Programmes required to provide targets and indicators 
already? The only novelty in this respect  would be the inclusion of such targets and 
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indicators in the new Cont ract  between the Commission and the Member States: a sof t  
enforcement  tool that  is likely to deliver weak substant ive compliance. 15
As for the new condit ionalit ies, instead of being placed on those programming processes 
that  would deliver outcome and performance accountabilit y (especially monitoring of 
physical indicators and evaluat ion)16,  they are intended to support  the achievement  of 
goals - minimum administ rat ive standards, compliance with the Stabilit y and Growth Pact , 
and the goals of the St rategy Europe 2020 – that  would only indirect ly cont ribute to the 
policy’ s overarching goals and apply to a level that  is most ly higher than that  of individual 
programmes. Clearly, they will not  t ip the balance in favour of performance-type 
accountability wit hin the programmes. In fact , they may make things worse, potent ially 
exacerbat ing the already demanding administ rat ive onus placed on programme managers 
and cont ribut ing to further goal displacement .  
The proposals contained in the Conclusions of the Fif th Cohesion Report  do not  appear 
suitable to alter the exist ing balance in the degree of cogency associated with the dif ferent  
programme management  procedures that  deliver f inancial and procedural accountability 
(which is st rong and likely to remain st rong) and outcome and performance accountabilit y 
(which is weak and likely to remain weak). 17 In order to achieve such new balance it  would 
perhaps be more eff icient  to pursue ‘ st rong’  and substant ive enforcement  of those 
processes that  deliver outcome and performance accountabilit y (principally monitoring and 
evaluat ion) within the programmes. However, to funct ion as performance tools and support  
effect iveness, such new condit ionalit ies would have to be established as part  of an 
integrated, systemic framework which f it s with the broader set  of rules that  are already in 
place, rather than in a mere incremental fashion which all too often opens the way to 
formal, rather than substant ial,  compliance. 
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 The same can be said about  the st rengthening of ongoing evaluat ion by rendering the Evaluat ion 
Plans compulsory and linked to guidance provided by the Commission as to what  they should entail.   
16
 For instance, whereas the Conclusions ment ion the need to st rengthen ex ant e evaluat ion and 
target  set t ing, no sanct ioning mechanisms are proposed to support  this goal. 
17
 For instance, making programmes’  Evaluat ion Plans compulsory and linked to guidance provided by 
the European Commission will not  change the fact  that  programme managers will cont inue to focus on 
N+2 and audit  compliance above all.  
Process /procedure Accountability type Compliance Enforcement Descript ion of assessment 5CR proposals 
Involvement of 
partners/stakeholders  
In principle all t ypes of accountabilit y, 
but  generally not  in pract ice. 
Weak. None. Involvement  of partners most ly 
formal; t ick-the-box approach. 
Vague reference to need to increase 
partnership [enforcement  likely to 
remain  unchanged]. 
Monitoring and Reporting In principle all t ypes of accountabilit y, 
in pract ice most ly f inancial and 
procedural.  
Medium. Medium. Monitoring systems st il l in some cases 
focussed on f inancial and procedural 
indicators and facing problems with 
data gathering. Report ing on 
outcomes st il l want ing. 
Vague reference to need to 
st rengthen indicators and target  
set t ing and report ing [enforcement  
likely to remain  unchanged]. 
Programme evaluation      
- ex ante  In principle f inancial and outcome, in 
pract ice largely depending on context  
and generally not  effect ively as it  
could be. 
Weak or st rong 
depending domest ic 
on contexts. Often 
weak. 
Soft .    Ex ant e evaluat ions j ust ify choices 
already made.  
Deficient  independence (depending on 
exist ing inst itut ional framework). 
Ex ant e to be reformed so that  it  
informs rather than j ust if ies policy 
choices. [unspecif ied, enforcement  
likely to remain  unchanged]. 
 
- ongoing In principle f inancial,  procedural, 
outcome and even performance, in 
pract ice largely depending on context . 
Weak or st rong 
depending domest ic 
on contexts. 
Soft .  Total f lexibilit y on when, how and on 
what  to carry out  evaluat ions during 
the programme period. What  is done 
depends largely on exist ing 
inst itut ional framework and degree of 
awareness. 
Ongoing programme evaluat ion to be 
linked to compulsory Evaluat ion Plans, 
drafted in compliance with COM 
guidance. [st rengthened compared to 
2007-13, but  st ill soft  and potent ially 
even counter- product ive (if it  results 
in formal rather than substant ial 
compliance)]  
- ex post In principle f inancial,  procedural, 
outcome and performance. Outcome 
and performance accountability could 
be reinforced. 
Mixed (COM in charge 
under st rong polit ical 
and administ rat ive 
cont rol by EP, ECA 
and MSs, but  
polit ically-driven 
compliance).  
Medium (st rong 
polit ical cont rol, but  
substant ial emphasis 




Lack of assessment  of policy impact  
and on programme impacts. 
Suggest ion that  MS prepare their own 
ex post  reports in addit ion to the 
evaluat ion work carried out  by COM, 
based on programme ongoing 
evaluat ions. [unspecif ied, not  likely to 
reinforce evaluat ion as accountabilit y 
tool] .  
Financial Management      
- (N+2) Financial accountabilit y.  St rong. Hard. Unspent  resources are lost . Reformed to st rengthen feasibilit y 
[enforcement  likely to remain 
unchanged]. 
- Claims processing/  
Payments 
Financial/ procedural account abilit y. St rong. Hard. Frequent  audit  procedures and 
recovery of unduly paid sums, 
irrespect ive of whether minor error or 
maj or fraud; sampling method 
amplif ies risk. 
Vague references to simplif icat ion, 
but  no radical overhaul [enforcement  
likely to remain unchanged]. 
- Systems description Financial/ procedural accountabilit y. St rong. Hard. Condit ions intermediary payments 
from EU budget . 
- 
16 
Table 1: Degree of compliance and accountability pursued 
Source: own elaborat ion. 
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